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Showing posts with label Berkshire Hathaway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Berkshire Hathaway. Show all posts

David Sokol on CNBC

One of Berkshire’s top managers named CEO of NetJets as an additional role.












Berkshire Hathaway Board wants to Split Class B shares

A recent SEC filing states that the Board of Directors unanimously approved, has declared to be advisable and is recommending to the shareholders of the Corporation for approval a 50-for-1 stock split of the Corporation’s Class B stock. The Board wants recommends this split regardless of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe deal.

Read the SEC filing here.

BrkbStockSplit

Shareholders will have the opportunity to vote at a meeting in January on the stock split. The expected price after the split should be in the range of $65 - $70.

Read more at Gurufocus.

Notes from Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting

BuffettShareholdersMeeting Notes on Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting From Reuters and GuruFocus

Q1 Operating Results and Book Value
Buffett told a record crowd at a somber annual meeting of his Berkshire Hathaway Inc that first-quarter operating profit fell and the company's book value declined 6 percent, as the recession weighed on many of the company's businesses and investments.
Operating profit fell about 12 percent from a year earlier to $1.7 billion, as most of Berkshire's businesses were "basically down," Buffett told an estimated 35,000 people at the meeting in downtown Omaha.

The decline in book value results in part from falling stock prices and higher losses on derivatives contracts, and comes on top of a 9.6 percent decline last year, the biggest drop since Buffett began running the company in 1965.


Predict Gloomy Economy but Stimulate Activity Working
Buffett offered a gloomy forecast for parts of the U.S. economy and Berkshire itself, though he said massive federal efforts to stimulate activity could pay off at a possible cost of higher inflation.

"It has been a very extraordinary year," Buffett said. "When the American public pulls back the way they have, the government does need to step in.... It is the right thing to do, but it won't be a free ride."


Housing Prices, Retailers and Newspapers
Buffett said housing prices have yet to stabilize broadly, that retailers may be under pressure for a "considerable period of time," and that he would not buy most U.S. newspaper companies "at any price."


Insurance not as good
He also said that in insurance, which comprises about half of Berkshire's operations, the earnings power "was not as good last year as normal" and "won't be as good this year."


Succession
Buffett also said the four candidates to replace him as Berkshire's chief investment officer failed to outperform the Standard & Poor's 500 last year, but remained confident they could perform well over time. Berkshire still has three internal candidates to replace Buffett as chief executive.

Buffett declined to name the candidates to replace him as chief executive officer and chief investment officer, but said Ajit Jain, who runs much of his insurance businesses and whom investors believe is a CEO contender, is irreplaceable.

"It would be impossible to replace Ajit," he said. "We wouldn't give the latitude to size or risk that we would give to Ajit.... We won't find a substitute for him."

Buffett said that for any CEO candidate, "the biggest job they have will be to develop relationships with potential sellers of businesses."

But he added that while Berkshire is much less nimble than it was when it was smaller, "our sustainable competitive advantage is we have a culture and business model that people would find very, very difficult to copy."

Munger added: "The stupidity in the management practices of the rest of the corporate world will likely be ample enough to give this company some comparative advantage in the future."


No stock buyback
Berkshire 's stock has fallen 39 percent since December 2007, and profit last year fell 62 percent from a year earlier. Buffett said he would not buy back Berkshire stock now, because its share price is not "demonstrably below" the company's intrinsic value.


Derivatives
Much of the worry about Berkshire has focused on Buffett's use of derivatives in making long-term bets on the direction of stocks and junk bonds, and which have so far resulted in billions of dollars of paper losses.

While Buffett still expects the contracts tied to equity stock indexes to make money, he said "we have run into far more bankruptcies in the last year than is normal." He said he now expects the contracts tied to credit defaults will show a loss before investment income, and perhaps after as well.

Buffett still distinguishes his derivatives from others such as credit default swaps, given that he collects billions of dollars of premiums upfront to invest and posts little collateral. He called other derivatives "a danger to the system. There is no question about that."


Wells Fargo & US Bancorp
Buffett expressed confidence in Wells Fargo & Co, one of Berkshire's biggest investments, saying it has "by far the best competitive position" of any large U.S. bank.
He also said some banks will weather the credit crisis well, saying that if he wanted to turn Berkshire into a bank holding company, "I would love to buy all of US Bancorp, or I would love to buy all of Wells."


Moody’s
He also defended Berkshire's roughly 20 percent stake in Moody's Corp, a credit rating agency faulted for failing to predict the housing crisis and assigning high ratings to risky debt for too long.

"They made a huge mistake" but were not alone, Buffett said. "The rating agency business is probably still a good business, (but) it won't be doing the volume probably for a long time in certain areas of the capital markets."

Live Bloggerage of Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders Meeting

Berkshire_Hathaway_shareholdersMeeting

Today is a very special day for Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders. The annual meeting of shareholders is happening in Omaha, Nebraska today and it is most anticipated shareholder meeting for any corporation. It is also known as the Woodstock for Capitalists.

Morningstar is blogging this event live; so go to link below to get live bloggerage (blogging + coverage)  of this event. We will have a discussion of some of the main questions that were asked at the end of the day.

Morningstar’s Live Bloggerage

LIVE COVERAGE BELOW FROM OMAHA WORLD-HERALD 

Investing like Warren Buffett | Part 2

Part 2 of our Investing like Warren Buffett series discusses his 1978 Chairman’s letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Since I am in the process of typing this and have not read it myself yet, I am excited to see what knowledge he had to impart on us at that stage of his life and investment career. This not only serves as great investment advice, but we are also able to learn how he analyzes businesses and what thought-processing went into picking the companies that became part of his investment portfolio.

I know we will also learn from his mistakes, which he is not shy about discussing in his letters as well. Let’s see what he has to share with us.

1978 Chairman’s letter to shareholders

Warren Buffett talks about investing in equity and his inability to predict stock market movements. What’s important is that he eludes to the fact that the equity holdings of his company will be worth a lot more than they paid, meaning that they were purchased with a significant margin of safety.

“We make no attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successfully forecasting short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our major equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money than we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to the operating returns of the insurance group.”


Warren Buffett on textiles:

“Slow capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. Our management is diligently pursuing such objectives. The problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing”

“The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage.”


Warren Buffett again reiterates the criteria for selecting stocks for ownership. However, it is apparent that there are times where market prices do not offer great bargains.

”We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of insurance company net work to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects , (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2), (3), but (4) often prevents action.”

 

Buffett emphasizes that they will be net buyers of stocks in most years, therefore, as with any type of purchase, if you are the buyer, you would prefer to prices to be lower than higher. Therefore, this major principle is applied to stocks as well. The time to be buying is when prices are going down, not increasing.

“We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying.”

 

Buffett on diversification. If you believe that a company has excellent future economics, he prefers to buy large quantities of that company, than allocating capital to many different companies.

“Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts.”

 

Buffett talks about buying companies where management is already established.

“Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to direct or even influence management policies of SAFECO. But why should we wish to do this? The record would indicate that they do a better job of managing their operations than we could do ourselves. While there may be less excitement and prestige in sitting back and letting others do the work, we think that is all one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent management. Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company run as well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit back and let management do its job.”

 

Buffett on use of retained earnings, dividend payments and share repurchases.

“We are not at all unhappy when our wholly-owned businesses retain all of their earnings if they can utilize internally those funds at attractive rates. Why should we feel differently about retention of earnings by companies in which we hold small equity interests, but where the record indicates even better prospects for profitable employment of capital? (This proposition cuts the other way, of course, in industries with low capital requirements, or if management has a record of plowing capital into projects of low profitability; then earnings should be paid out or used to repurchase shares – often by far the most attractive option for capital utilization.)”

 

Another great report with some key points.
These are some points I learned from this report.

  1. Do not attempt to forecast stock market movements. Focus on the underlying business.
  2. Businesses with low capital turnover and low profit margins should be avoided as long-term investments.
  3. Investments could fit all your criteria upon analysis, however, if the price is not right, it does not make a good investment. Be patient.
  4. Management is very important when selecting businesses.

What have you gotten from this report.
Leave a comment.


Related Articles
Invest Like Warren Buffett Part 1>>

Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual part 4

Owner-related business principles cont’d

14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.

I really believe that Berkshire is for long-term investors, and as Warren Buffett says, his communication and policies do indicate that philosophy. A philosophy of not splitting the stock, or making investments that are beneficial over the long-run all dictate this underlying philosophy. Even today, investors are doubting the decisions made by Warren Buffett, but they fail to realize one thing, he is a man of integrity that will take this company even further. Just wait and see.

15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.

Bruce Berkowitz took Warren Buffett’s advice and sold off shares of Berkshire because he believes he can find bargains in today’s environment where he could earn a better return. I think however, because of Berkshire’s sheer size, it would be difficult to earn a high return as well, however, this environment offered so many opportunities, I believe he can earn a significant return for his long-term investors as well. I feel honored to have bought shares during his tenure. It is my intention to hold forever.

This is the end of the principles within the Owner’s Manual. The next section would be a discussion of his definition of INTRINSIC VALUE. Stay tuned.!!

Related Links:
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 3
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 2
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 1

Berkshire Hathaway | Owner's Manual Pt. 3


Owner-related business principles cont'd

9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.

This has been the reason why Berkshire has not and will not pay dividends. If they continue to find opportunities to effectively deploy capital, they will not issue the funds to shareholders in the form of dividends. They have continuously proven that retained earnings are being effectively used, therefore shareholders should appreciate the fact that they have one of the best capital allocators in the world investing for them.

 

10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance — not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company — and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to — on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

The important point to understand here is that Berkshire does not dilute the owners' common stock by issuing shares. The only time that issuing shares make sense is when there is an equitable trade in value. Also, pay attention to when companies you own issue stock and question whether or not the stock is undervalued; this is normally an indication that the managers are not wisely investing your money.

 

11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.

This principle speaks to the competency of the management. They will not invest unnecessarily in a sub-par business and will not exit a business if it can still act as a cash cow and add to the float. They will however, take action if a company problem's can be cured.

 

12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.

This is one of the most important principles that investors should pay attention to. Buffett is as clear and honest as possible when he reports results to the owners of Berkshire Hathaway. His annual reports are seen as some of the most valuable investment documents in the value investing world. They are filled with precious information about his investing philosophy and decisions over the years and is considered a must read for all in the business. His reporting techniques should be used as a model for the industry.

 

13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.

Buffett makes it clear that they do not discuss their investment ideas because these ideas are rare and may be subject to competitive appropriation. He fully believes in discussing his investment philosophy which he learned from Benjamin Graham.



For the detailed reading of The Owner's Manual, please refer to Berkshire's Hathaway's website.


Related Links:
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 4
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 3
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 2
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 1

Berkshire's 2008 annual report: America's best days lie ahead

Click image to go to letter. Click here to Digg.

Berkshire2008

Berkshire Hathaway | Owner's manual Pt. 2

Owner-related business principles cont'd.

5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the 
limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are very knowledgeable about accounting and its limitations in presenting the best performance of companies consolidated on Berkshire's financial statements. They analyze each business and the environment that they operate in and relay their conclusions to their shareholders. They basically assist shareholders in making well-informed decisions about the operating businesses of Berkshire Hathaway. They are very honest with their evaluations as can be seen in the Chairman's letters; when businesses do well, they acknowledge that and when businesses perform below expectations, they are not shy about stating those facts either. You cannot put enough value on honest management, especially today.

 

6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.

It is obvious that Warren Buffett takes does not focus totally on reportable numbers that appear of financial statements (using GAAP standards), but puts more emphasis on the true earnings of a company because he knows that eventually, it will be reflected in the intrinsic value of the business. It is important to buy businesses that are of greater overall value based on actual earnings and not reportable earnings; the rest will take care of itself. He also understands that there are many ways undistributed earnings can be allocated within the company that will add value to the underlying business such as repurchasing shares or reinvesting in the business. He believes these to be alternatives that should be considered as effective use of capital at certain times.

 

7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)

Berkshire's management does not believe in having a lot of leverage and because of the nature of the businesses they own, they generate a lot of cash (from insurance businesses) that can be used for investments and financing purchases. This cash is referred to as float and it is free once Berkshire's insurance operations break even. A no debt structure, even though, may prevent them from making huge investments that will increase returns, allows Buffett and Munger to sleep well at night because they have nothing to worry about when it comes to debt maturity dates and such. In this current turbulent times, the $40 billion in cash he has available is serving us shareholders very well. In several years, I assure you the economic value of the business will be greatly improved.

 

8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.

Buffett and Munger are the most shareholder-friendly managers you can find in business today. All the purchases they make are done with the intentions of improve Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value. Once you read this document, you will see that this should serve as a model of corporate governance for all companies.

For the detailed reading of The Owner's Manual, please refer to Berkshire's Hathaway's website.

Related Links:
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 4
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 3
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 2
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 1

Berkshire Hathaway | Owner's manual Pt. 1

[Source: www.berkshirehathaway.com | Owner's manual]

Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire's Chairman, issued what he calls "An Owner's Manual" to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway in 1996. This booklet contains 13 economic principles to assist new shareholders to clearly understand the way Berkshire is run. Many corporations lay out corporate governance guidelines for their owners, but none has been down in a very simplified and conversational way, as Warren Buffett is typically known for. This would be a great way for new investors to learn what one should look for in great management and also understand the way Buffett thinks as well.

The owner's manual series will be divided into 3 parts. We will first concentrate on the first 3 principles of the manual in this posting and highlight key points that should be noted.

Enjoy.

Owner-Related Business Principles

1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.

i. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger both view shareholders as owner-partners. Warren Buffett truly emphasizes the importance management plays in his decisions to buy into businesses. He is no different and truly sets that example. They fully grasp and respect that shareholders are owners of public corporations and that their decisions should be based on what is ultimately best for the shareholders and disregard personal interests.

ii. They both are highly invested in the company.  They both have the majority of their net worth in Berkshire stock and is therefore, as Mr. Buffett would say, "eating their own cooking." This is an important point to consider when looking at investments. What percentage of the stock does management own? Are their interests aligned with that of the shareholders? Well, a great way to tell is if they own their own company's stock.

iii. The corporate entity does not own the business. Legally, the creation of a corporation frees management from liability. However, what Mr. Buffett is indicating in this first principle is that they view the company merely as a vehicle through which shareholders own the assets of the business. This first point alone says a lot of the management of Berkshire Hathaway and as soon as you are able to find management in other companies that exhibit the same qualities in a great business, you know that this is a company that you should look into further and buy and hold on forever. Such companies are hard to find; such management are even more rare. What he expects of shareholders as well is that they view themselves as owners that are in it for the long haul. He invests with a long term horizon and would like his shareholders to have that time horizon as well; therefore they should be willing to own the stock for the rest of their lives.

 

2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.

Charlie Munger's family has 90% or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares.

Warren Buffett has about 99%. His relatives also keep a large portion of their net worth 
in  Berkshire stock as well.

He continues to explain under this second principle that Berkshire Hathaway is a diversified group of quality business, and even though they are unable to guarantee results, they will make money when their shareholders make money and also lose money when their shareholders lose money.

 

3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future — a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.

The important point to understand from this third principle is that the management of Berkshire is focused on per-share intrinsic business value gains.

Also, Mr. Buffett has been telling his shareholders for a long time that this rate of gain will decrease as the amount of capital they have to work with increases. They will have to find larger investment opportunities that will have a significant impact on the intrinsic business value.

 

4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.

Warren Buffett not only owns great businesses, but also owns percentages of great businesses as well. He mentions in the commentary following the fourth principle that the difficulty arises when they have too much cash on hand and not many great investment opportunities. However, he reassures us that a depressed market, [like today], provides great opportunities to buy entire businesses, or add to the ownership of the great businesses as well. These companies also repurchase their own stock in depressed markets as well, so the shareholders benefit even more.

 

For the detailed reading of The Owner's Manual, please refer to Berkshire's Hathaway's website.

Related Links:
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 4
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 3
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 2
Berkshire Hathaway | Owner’s Manual Part 1

Warren Buffett U.N.C. 1996 lecture | Part 6: Berkshire's performance, children and inheritance

1996 U.N.C. Lecture Series continued...

Talking about Berkshire's performance...

"The greater the capital we work with at Berkshire, the worst we are going to do, everything else being equal, in terms of percentage return on equity."

He says the more capital you have, the smaller the number of investments you can make that would have an impact on the overall net worth of the company. Berkshire's size has increased so much that only huge investments would make sense for the shareholders.

Talking about family, inheritance and money...

"You should leave your children with enough money so that they can do anything, but not enough where they would do nothing."

This is one of my favorite quotes and I like this idea when it comes to inherited wealth. You would want endless possibilities for your children, but you would also want them to be independent and learn from life's challenges as well. The majority of us learned a great deal through the difficult periods of our lives. No one should be robbed of those experiences.

I also admired when Buffett acknowledged that this society was responsible for the majority of his wealth, so he felt the obligation to give back. A very honorable and respectable motivation behind his charitable nature.

We have come to the end of the 1996 U.N.C. lecture series and I hope you can see why I believe this to be one of my favorite sources of Warren Buffett's wisdom online. I hope you have come appreciate not only his investing wisdom, but also gained insight into his character of integrity as well. Thank you for sharing this journey; I hope it helped you build on your foundation of investing or added to your current system.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

My next series will be an in-depth analysis of his Chairman's letters going as far back as we could find. This should carry on for several months, but any student of Warren Buffett knows that this is a must-read in order to understand how he thinks about his investments and policy decisions.

Morningstar 2008 C.E.O. of the year | Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

I thought this video by Morningstar to be an appropriate interruption of our U.N.C. lecture series. Morningstar is the most respected of companies that analyzes funds and I am not surprise to see that they announced today that Warren Buffett is their 2008 CEO of the year. Listen to the video below to see why.

Congratulations Mr. Buffett!

These are qualities Morningstar look for in the C.E.O.s of the year:

  1. C.E.O.s that have created long term values for their shareholders.

  2. C.E.O.s that are good independent thinkers.

  3. C.E.O.s that are shareholder-friendly; that view common shareholders as partners in their businesses.

When I looked at these criteria, I thought Warren Buffett epitomizes what it means to be a C.E.O. and that he should be the model for all C.E.O.s out there. Through his communication and policies to shareholders, it is very obvious that he works on our behalf. Congratulations to Mr. Buffett once again.

For more from Morningstar on why he earned this award in 2008, refer to link below.
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=269952

Full Disclosure: Long BRK.B

About | Warren Buffett

WarrenBuffett

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[Image credit: Stephanie Kuykenal/Bloomberg News]

Age: 77

Fortune: Self-made

Source: Berkshire Hathaway

Net worth: $62.0 billion (as of first half of 2008)

Country of Citizenship: United States

Residence: Omaha, Nebraska

Industry: Investments

Marital Status: widowed, remarried, 3 children

Education: University of Nebraska Lincoln, Bachelor of Arts / Science
Columbia University, Master of Science

America's most beloved investor is now the world's richest man. Soared past friend and bridge partner Bill Gates as shares of Berkshire Hathaway climbed 25% since the middle of last July. Son of Nebraska politician delivered newspapers as a boy. Filed first tax return at age 13, claiming $35 deduction for bicycle. Studied under value investing guru Benjamin Graham at Columbia. Took over textile firm Berkshire Hathaway 1965. Today holding company invested in insurance (Geico, General Re), jewelry (Borsheim's), utilities (MidAmerican Energy), food (Dairy Queen, See's Candies). Also has noncontrolling stakes in Anheuser-Busch, Coca-Cola, Wells Fargo. Insurance operations flourished in 2007. "That party is over. It's a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008." The Oracle of Omaha issued a challenge to members of The Forbes 400 in October; said he would donate $1 million to charity if the collective group of richest Americans would admit they pay less taxes, as a percentage of income, than their secretaries. Had long promised to give away his fortune posthumously. Irrevocably earmarked the majority of his Berkshire shares to charity in 2006, mostly to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Gift was valued at $31 billion on day of announcement; donation will far exceed that sum so long as Berkshire shares continue to rise.
[Source: Forbes.com]

Companies in Berkshire Hathaway's Portfolio: The Coca Cola Company, American Express, Wells Fargo, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Union Pacific, Proctor and Gamble, US Bancorp, Wellpoint, Johnson and Johnson, Conocophillips, POSCO, Wal-Mart, Washington Post, Nike, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Suntrust Bank, Iron Mountain, COSTCO, Sanofi-Aventis, United Healthcare, Ingersoll-Rand, Home Depot, Lowe's, Kraft, Carmax, Bank of America.

Recommended readings: Security Analysis, The Intelligent Investor, Common stocks and Uncommon profits, The Theory of Investment Value, The Essays of Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Chairman's Letters to shareholders, Beating the Street, One Up on Wall Street


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